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Research on the Coordinated Governance Mechanism of Cross-Regional and Cross-Basin Ecological Compensation in the Yangtze River Delta

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  • Zhen Yu

    (College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, China)

  • Qingjian Zhao

    (College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, China)

Abstract

The development of a regionally integrated economy promotes the development of river basin ecological compensation toward cross-regional coordinated governance. The ecological compensation in the Yangtze River Delta has developed by leaps and bounds, which is conducive to the research on the collaborative governance mechanism. Taking the ecological compensation policy data in the Yangtze River Delta as the research object, and using the social network analysis method, this paper analyzes the current situation of cross-basin cooperation in the Yangtze River Delta. A collaborative governance network is formed with 74 ecological compensation agreements, and the distribution law of the overall collaborative network is found. Using IAD to decompose the ecological compensation agreement rules, 303 institutional units were obtained, of which, 198 were selection rules, accounting for 65%. The research results show that: (1) The ecological compensation cooperation in the Yangtze River Delta region is mainly concentrated in the Jiaxing Jiashan, Wujiang District, Suzhou, and Qingpu District, Shanghai, forming a close cooperation triangle network, and Shanghai plays a strong “intermediary” role in it. (2) In institutional grammar analysis, the formulation of rules is biased toward choice rules and payoff rules, that is to say, the content of the rules is mostly how to cooperate and how to reward and punish but there is a lack of specific action scenarios and standards. The combination of social network and institutional analysis and development framework is conducive to the study of the ecological collaborative governance mechanism of the Yangtze River Delta, breaking the gap between different fields and regions, enhancing the enthusiasm for multi-subject governance in the Yangtze River Delta region, and giving full play to the effectiveness of multi-subject governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhen Yu & Qingjian Zhao, 2022. "Research on the Coordinated Governance Mechanism of Cross-Regional and Cross-Basin Ecological Compensation in the Yangtze River Delta," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(16), pages 1-20, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:16:p:9881-:d:885315
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Qiuyan Wang & Qingjian Zhao, 2022. "Assessing Ecological Infrastructure Investments—A Case Study of Water Rights Trading in Lu’an City, Anhui Province, China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(4), pages 1-23, February.
    2. North, Douglass C, 1994. "Economic Performance through Time," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 359-368, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jiangyang Lin & Yuanhong Tian & Qian Yao & Yong Shi, 2023. "Structural Characteristics of Intergovernmental Water Pollution Control Cooperation Networks Using Social Network Analysis and GIS in Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration, China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(18), pages 1-18, September.

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