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Behavioral Evolutionary Analysis between the Government and Uncertified Recycler in China’s E-Waste Recycling Management

Author

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  • Qixiang Wang

    (College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China)

  • Linghui Kong

    (School of Accounting, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou 510320, China)

  • Jin Li

    (School of Management and E-Business, Key Research Institute-Modern Business Research Center, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China)

  • Bangyi Li

    (College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China)

  • Fan Wang

    (School of Accounting, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China)

Abstract

In many developing countries, the existence of the uncertified recycler seriously hinders the healthy development of the waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE or e-waste) recycling industry. As a result, how the government can regulate the uncertified recycler to improve environment and public health during the recycling processes has become a critical issue. To help tackle this issue, we build an evolutionary game model to study the interactions between the government and the uncertified recycler. We conduct stability analysis of each participant and obtain four asymptotically stable states. Furthermore, we conduct numerical simulations for comparative analysis based on the current situation of the Chinese e-waste recycling industry. Our results are as follows. First, there exist multiple asymptotically stable states for the government and the uncertified recycler, namely (no-governance, maintaining status quo), (governance, maintaining status quo), (governance, industrial upgrading), and (no-governance, industrial upgrading). Then, we verify the validity of the evolutionary game model through numerical simulations and find that penalty, supervision cost, additional investment cost, and financial subsidy can significantly influence the behavioral strategy of the government and the uncertified recycler. Finally, we find that the government should adopt the reward-penalty-supervision mechanism to promote the healthy development of the e-waste recycling industry and protect the environment and public health. Specifically, first, the government’s subsidy for the uncertified recycler has upper and lower limits. Exceeding the upper limit will result in an excessive financial burden to the government, while falling below the lower limit will hinder the uncertified recycler from technology upgrading. Second, the government should strengthen the supervision of the uncertified recycler and increase the punishment for violations. Third, the government should focus on controlling the supervision cost. Fourth, according to the asymptotically stable state (no-governance, industrial upgrading), the government should prepare to withdraw from the market when the uncertified recycler chooses industrial upgrading.

Suggested Citation

  • Qixiang Wang & Linghui Kong & Jin Li & Bangyi Li & Fan Wang, 2020. "Behavioral Evolutionary Analysis between the Government and Uncertified Recycler in China’s E-Waste Recycling Management," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(19), pages 1-15, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:17:y:2020:i:19:p:7221-:d:423078
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Liu, Huihui & Lei, Ming & Deng, Honghui & Keong Leong, G. & Huang, Tao, 2016. "A dual channel, quality-based price competition model for the WEEE recycling market with government subsidy," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 59(PB), pages 290-302.
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    6. Kumar, Amit & Holuszko, Maria & Espinosa, Denise Crocce Romano, 2017. "E-waste: An overview on generation, collection, legislation and recycling practices," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 32-42.
    7. Gu, Yifan & Wu, Yufeng & Xu, Ming & Wang, Huaidong & Zuo, Tieyong, 2016. "The stability and profitability of the informal WEEE collector in developing countries: A case study of China," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 18-26.
    8. Yue Wang & Baoying Xin & Zhe Wang & Bangyi Li, 2019. "Managing Supplier-Manufacturer Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Product Design and Take-Back Legislation," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(4), pages 1-26, February.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Qiang Mu & Peng Guo & Ding Wang, 2022. "Optimal Subsidy Support for the Provision of Elderly Care Services in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Analysis," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(5), pages 1-20, February.
    4. Xiao-Shan Yang & Xiao-Xue Zheng & Tian-Yu Zhang & Ying Du & Fengru Long, 2021. "Waste Electrical and Electronic Fund Policy: Current Status and Evaluation of Implementation in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(24), pages 1-27, December.
    5. Tingting Liu & Qian Zhang & Zichen Zheng & Shangyun Wu & Zhixiong Weng, 2022. "Stakeholder Analysis of the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Internet Recycling Industry," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(16), pages 1-13, August.

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