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Research on Resource Utilization of Bi-Level Non-Cooperative Game Systems Based on Unit Resource Return

Author

Listed:
  • Bo Fu

    (Hubei Key Laboratory for High-Efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy and Operation Control of Energy Storage System, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China)

  • Peiwen Li

    (Hubei Key Laboratory for High-Efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy and Operation Control of Energy Storage System, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China)

  • Yi Quan

    (School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China)

Abstract

In a competitive market, due to differences in the nature of various power generation entities, there is a decline in resource utilization and difficulties in ensuring a return on investment for generating units within the system. A bi-level non-cooperative game model based on the Unit Resource Return (URR) is proposed to safeguard the interests and demands of each power generation unit while improving the overall resource utilization rate of the system. Firstly, we construct a comprehensive energy-trading framework for the overall system and analyze the relationship between the Independent System Operator (ISO) and the generation units. Secondly, we propose the Unit Resource Return (URR), inspired by the concept of input-output efficiency in economics. URR evaluates the return on unit resource input by taking the maximum generation potential of each unit as the benchmark. Finally, a bi-level non-cooperative game model is established. In the lower-level non-cooperative game, the generating units safeguard their own interests, while in the upper-level, the ISO adjusts the output allocation and engages in a master–slave game between generating units to ensure the overall operational efficiency of the system. URR is adopted as the ISO’s price-clearing equilibrium criterion, enabling the optimization of both resource profitability and allocation. Ultimately, both the upper and lower-level decision variables reach a Nash equilibrium. The experimental results show that the bi-level non-cooperative game model based on the Unit Resource Return improves the overall resource utilization of the system and enhances the long-term operational motivation of the generating units.

Suggested Citation

  • Bo Fu & Peiwen Li & Yi Quan, 2025. "Research on Resource Utilization of Bi-Level Non-Cooperative Game Systems Based on Unit Resource Return," Energies, MDPI, vol. 18(9), pages 1-18, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jeners:v:18:y:2025:i:9:p:2396-:d:1650915
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