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Instituciones Fiscales y el Tamaño y Distribución Inter-Regional de la Redistribución Pública

Author

Listed:
  • Raul A. Ponce-Rodriguez

    (Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Administración,)

  • Juan Medina-Guirado

    (Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Administración,)

Abstract

Las instituciones fiscales, que determinan la responsabilidad del diseño de impuestos y gasto entre los diferentes niveles de gobierno, son importantes determinantes del tamaño y eficiencia de la redistribución pública. En este artículo, se desarrolla un análisis comparativo del impacto en el esfuerzo del gobierno en redistribuir el ingreso, entre la descentralización fiscal en y una política de compartir el ingreso fiscal. Los principales resultados son: primero, el tamaño del presupuesto en redistribución es el mismo para una economía con descentralización o en la que se comparte el ingreso fiscal. Segundo, las instituciones fiscales implican una asignación diferente en la distribución regional de transferencias públicas. Tercero, al escoger entre descentralización y el compartir el ingreso fiscal, existe un intercambio entre la eficiencia y la distribución regional de las transferencias públicas.

Suggested Citation

  • Raul A. Ponce-Rodriguez & Juan Medina-Guirado, 2018. "Instituciones Fiscales y el Tamaño y Distribución Inter-Regional de la Redistribución Pública," Ensayos Revista de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, vol. 37(1), pages 1-42, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ere:journl:v:37:y:2018:i:1:id:120
    DOI: 10.29105/ensayos37.1-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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