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Governance and CEO pay and performance in non‐profit organizations

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  • Carlos Pestana Barros
  • Francisco Nunes

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyze the pay and performance of chief executive officers (CEOs) in Portuguese, non‐profit organizations (NPOs), focusing on the role played by the economic performance of the organization, together with that played by the structure of the board and the individual characteristics of the manager. If the CEO can influence the board structure, agency problems arise, which in turn allow the CEO to extract rent and demand compensation in excess of the equilibrium level. Design/methodology/approach - An ordinary least squares (OLS) model and an instrumental variable (IV) models are estimated for comparative purposes. The IV permits to account for endogenous variables in the regression. Findings - It is concluded that governance is important in the Portuguese non‐profit sector. Several variables affect the CEO, namely, organization performance variables, board composition variables and individual variables. This result highlights the urgent need for a code of governance practice to be introduced in this sector. Moreover, the paper integrates human capital in the definition of the earnings, concluding that this also contributes to earnings. Research limitations/implications - This paper has two limitations. The first is related to the data set and the second with the method adopted. With the reference to the data set, the span is limited and therefore the generalization of this result is questionable. A larger data span is needed to confirm the present results. Relative to the method, the OLS is unable to handle endogeneity variables in a regression. The instrumental variables (IV) can overcome this result, but some critics to this method have appear recently, when there are heterogeneous across subjects and local IV are needed. Practical implication - A governance code should be adopted, involving NPO managers in their definition. A regulatory agency that will be the watch dog of the process should be implemented to enforce the modernization of Portuguese NPO. Originality/value - This is the first paper analyzing governance issues on Portuguese NPO and the second paper at European level on NPO governance. It clarifies two issues, the absence of governance principles in Portuguese NPO and the need of a regulatory agency in this context.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Pestana Barros & Francisco Nunes, 2007. "Governance and CEO pay and performance in non‐profit organizations," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 34(11), pages 811-827, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:ijsepp:v:34:y:2007:i:11:p:811-827
    DOI: 10.1108/03068290710826404
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Weisbach, Michael S, 1998. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 96-118, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wellens, Lore & Jegers, Marc, 2014. "Effective governance in nonprofit organizations: A literature based multiple stakeholder approach," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 223-243.
    2. Majerová Ingrid, 2019. "Socio-economic Development and its Impact on Health Personnel in Regions of Visegrad Group Plus Countries," Review of Economic Perspectives, Sciendo, vol. 19(1), pages 3-24, March.
    3. Francis Amagoh, 2015. "Improving the credibility and effectiveness of non-governmental organizations," Progress in Development Studies, , vol. 15(3), pages 221-239, July.
    4. Barros, Carlos Pestana & Nunes, Francisco, 2008. "Social capital in non-profit organizations: A multi-disciplinary perspective," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1554-1569, August.
    5. Athar, Iqbal & Khan, Muhammad Irfan & Ali, Saffar, 2012. "CEO Compensation and Bank Performance," MPRA Paper 42402, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Sep 2012.

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