Estimating the Union Wage Effect for Public School Teachers When All Teachers Are Unionized
The purpose of this paper is to quantify, as best as possible, the union wage effect achieved by the teachers' unions in Pennsylvania. As the legal right for local teachers' organizations to collectively bargain remains controlled by state legislatures, it tends to be the case that either all contracts in a state are collectively bargained locally or none are. Consequently, a wage regression cannot separately identify the union wage effect from a state-wide compensating differential. Instead of relying on interstate salary variation, therefore, intrastate salary variation will be analyzed. In particular, the minimum salary paid across a small group of geographically close, non-urban, and relatively homogeneous school districts will be taken as an upper bound on the competitive teacher salary for all such districts. This upper bound will then be used to place a lower bound on the union rent paid by each district.
Volume (Year): 30 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
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