From networked control systems to supply chain cyber-security: A redundant channel approach for FDIA mitigation

With the deeper integration of supply chains (SCs) and communication technologies, modern SCs are now facing cyber-security threats, particularly due to the increased connectivity and data vulnerabilities within networked environments. This study investigates the impacts of the cyber-attack, i.e. the false data injection attack (FDIA) on the SC and designs countermeasures to the FDIA. First, a novel SC framework is established from the control-theoretic perspective. The role of each member in the SC is conceptualized in accordance with the definition of the networked control system. Second, the FDIA is regarded as a distinctive SC risk, which is characterized by the malicious manipulation of transmitted data and the destruction of its authenticity. Third, the redundant channel strategy is employed to provide reliable communication channels that are free of cyber-attacks for emergency suppliers and temporary warehouses exchanging data with the decision centre. Furthermore, mixed integer programming models are proposed to determine countermeasures and optimize cyber-security investments. Through simulation-based analysis, the synergistic impacts of the FDIA on the SC performance under different cyber-attack intensities and different customer behaviours are examined. The results illustrate the efficacy of the proposed strategies in mitigating the adverse effects of the FDIA and improving SC resilience. The findings enhance the understanding of SC managers regarding the adoption of recovery strategies to mitigate cyber-attack risks. Moreover, the outcomes can be instructive for cyber-attackers when launching the FDIA in the SC context.