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Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer, Democratic Choice and Taxation. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1999)

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  • Aidt, Toke

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  • Aidt, Toke, 2001. "Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer, Democratic Choice and Taxation. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1999)," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 203-206, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:203-206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    2. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-121, February.
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