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Rules versus discretion in monetary policy historically contemplated

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  • Glasner, David

Abstract

Monetary policy rules are attempts to cope with the implications of having a medium of exchange whose value exceeds its cost of production. Two classes of monetary rules can be identified: (1) price rules that target the value of money in terms of a real commodity, e.g., gold, or in terms of some index of prices, and (2) quantity rules that target the quantity of money in circulation. Historically, price rules, e.g. the gold standard, have predominated, but the Bank Charter Act of 1844 imposed a quantity rule as an adjunct to the gold standard, because the gold standard had performed unsatisfactorily after being restored in Britain at the close of the Napoleonic Wars. A quantity rule was not proposed independently of a price rule until Henry Simons proposed a constant money supply consisting of government-issued fiat currency and deposits issued by banks operating on a 100% reserve basis. Simons argued that such a plan would be ideal if it could be implemented because it would deprive the monetary authority of any discretionary decision-making power. Nevertheless, Simons concluded that such a plan was impractical and supported a price rule to stabilize the price level. Simons's student Milton Friedman revived Simons's argument against discretion and modified Simons's plan for 100% reserve banking and a constant money supply into his k% rule for monetary growth. This paper examines the doctrinal and ideological origins and background that lay behind the rules versus discretion distinction.

Suggested Citation

  • Glasner, David, 2017. "Rules versus discretion in monetary policy historically contemplated," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PA), pages 24-41.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:54:y:2017:i:pa:p:24-41
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2017.05.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bennett T. McCallum, 1987. "The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: a concrete example," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 73(Sep), pages 10-18.
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    1. Cleaning Up After Burns’s Mess
      by David Glasner in Uneasy Money on 2019-05-09 04:24:44

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    Cited by:

    1. Tavlas, George S., 2021. "A Reconsideration Of The Doctrinal Foundations Of Monetary Policy Rules: Fisher Versus Chicago," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 55-82, March.
    2. Samuel Demeulemeester, 2018. "The 100% money proposal and its implications for banking: the Currie–Fisher approach versus the Chicago Plan approach," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 357-387, March.
    3. James Forder & Hugo Monnery, 2019. "Why Did Milton Friedman Win the Nobel Prize? A Consideration of His Early Work on Stabilization Policy," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 16(1), pages 130–145-1, March.

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