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The effect of Medicare coverage for the disabled on the market for private insurance

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  • Cogan, John F.
  • Hubbard, R. Glenn
  • Kessler, Daniel P.

Abstract

We investigate whether the removal of high-cost individuals from private insurance markets leads to greater coverage for individuals who are similar but not as high cost. Using data on insurance coverage from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we estimate the effect of the extension of Medicare to the disabled on the private insurance coverage of non-disabled individuals. We find that the insurance coverage of individuals who had a health condition that limited their ability to work increased significantly in states with high versus low rates of disability.

Suggested Citation

  • Cogan, John F. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Kessler, Daniel P., 2010. "The effect of Medicare coverage for the disabled on the market for private insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 418-425, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:29:y:2010:i:3:p:418-425
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Gruber, 2003. "Evaluating Alternative Approaches to Incremental Health-Insurance Expansion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 271-276, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Timothy M. Smeeding, 2018. "The PSID in Research and Policy," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 680(1), pages 29-47, November.
    2. Jeffrey Clemens, 2015. "Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 109-134, April.

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