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Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

  • Agarwal, Sumit
  • Amromin, Gene
  • Ben-David, Itzhak
  • Chomsisengphet, Souphala
  • Evanoff, Douglas D.

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 113 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 29-52

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:113:y:2014:i:1:p:29-52
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  13. Bond, Philip & Musto, David K. & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2009. "Predatory mortgage lending," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 412-427, December.
  14. Sumit Agarwal & Gene Amromin & Itzhak Ben-David & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Douglas D. Evanoff, 2010. "Learning to Cope: Voluntary Financial Education and Loan Performance during a Housing Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 495-500, May.
  15. Sumit Agarwal & Paige M. Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, 2009. "Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring Puzzles?," NBER Working Papers 14659, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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