IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jaecon/v79y2025i2s0165410124000879.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sell-by-plan mandate and opportunistic insider selling: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Ye, Pengfei
  • Zeng, Qingsheng
  • Zhang, Cheng

Abstract

We examine whether requiring insiders to sell their stock shares based on pre-disclosed plans can mitigate opportunistic insider selling activities and, more importantly, to what extent insiders can circumvent this regulation. Using China's mandate enacted in 2017 as the setting, we demonstrate that a sell-by-plan mandate can reduce opportunistic selling activities. However, insiders can circumvent this mandate by strategically initiating their plans before bad news. We find that this gaming practice is widespread in China. It is concentrated in firms with weak governance but largely absent in firms with strong governance. We also find that China's stock market cannot discern whether a plan is opportunistically motivated upon its announcement. Overall, this paper highlights a new form of opportunism in insider trading—opportunistic planning—and proposes a method to identify such plans. Our results also suggest that government regulation, without strong governance, could be ineffective in curbing corporate executives' opportunistic behaviors.

Suggested Citation

  • Ye, Pengfei & Zeng, Qingsheng & Zhang, Cheng, 2025. "Sell-by-plan mandate and opportunistic insider selling: Evidence from China," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:79:y:2025:i:2:s0165410124000879
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101757
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000879
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101757?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alldredge, Dallin M. & Cicero, David C., 2015. "Attentive insider trading," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 84-101.
    2. Vyacheslav Fos & Wei Jiang, 2016. "Out-of-the-Money CEOs: Private Control Premium and Option Exercises," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(6), pages 1549-1585.
    3. Stephen A. Ross, 1977. "The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 23-40, Spring.
    4. DeFond, Mark & Li, Zengquan & Wong, T.J. & Wu, Kaiwen, 2024. "Competence vs. Independence: Auditors' connections with members of their clients’ business community," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1).
    5. Stephen L Lenkey, 2019. "Cancellable Insider Trading Plans: An Analysis of SEC Rule 10b5-1," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(12), pages 4947-4996.
    6. Fich, Eliezer M. & Parrino, Robert & Tran, Anh L., 2023. "When and how are rule 10b5-1 plans used for insider stock sales?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(1), pages 1-26.
    7. Lauren Cohen & Christopher Malloy & Lukasz Pomorski, 2012. "Decoding Inside Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(3), pages 1009-1043, June.
    8. Alan D. Jagolinzer, 2009. "SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders' Strategic Trade," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(2), pages 224-239, February.
    9. Billings, Mary Brooke & Cedergren, Matthew C., 2015. "Strategic silence, insider selling and litigation risk," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 119-142.
    10. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-887, August.
    11. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:2:p:701-716 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Alan D. Jagolinzer & David F. Larcker & Daniel J. Taylor, 2011. "Corporate Governance and the Information Content of Insider Trades," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5), pages 1249-1274, December.
    13. S.P. Kothari & Liandong Zhang & Luo Zuo, 2023. "Disclosure regulation: past, present, and future," Chapters, in: Gilles Hilary & David McLean (ed.), Handbook of Financial Decision Making, chapter 10, pages 215-234, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Seyhun, H. Nejat, 1986. "Insiders' profits, costs of trading, and market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 189-212, June.
    15. Larcker, David F. & Rusticus, Tjomme O., 2010. "On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 186-205, April.
    16. Peter M. DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1998. "The Optimal Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 602-632, June.
    17. Dai, Lili & Fu, Renhui & Kang, Jun-Koo & Lee, Inmoo, 2016. "Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 235-253.
    18. Ke, Bin & Huddart, Steven & Petroni, Kathy, 2003. "What insiders know about future earnings and how they use it: Evidence from insider trades," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 315-346, August.
    19. Liu, Zheng & Shen, Hongtao & Welker, Michael & Zhang, Ning & Zhao, Yang, 2021. "Gone with the wind: An externality of earnings pressure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1).
    20. Stephen L. Lenkey, 2014. "Advance Disclosure of Insider Trading," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(8), pages 2504-2537.
    21. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1992. "Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 106-122, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Contreras, Harold & Korczak, Adriana & Korczak, Piotr, 2023. "Religion and insider trading profits," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    2. Pham, Man Duy (Marty), 2022. "Management friendship and insider opportunism," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    3. Fich, Eliezer M. & Parrino, Robert & Tran, Anh L., 2023. "When and how are rule 10b5-1 plans used for insider stock sales?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(1), pages 1-26.
    4. Dai, Lili & Fu, Renhui & Kang, Jun-Koo & Lee, Inmoo, 2016. "Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 235-253.
    5. Deng, Jun & Pan, Huifeng & Yan, Hongjun & Yang, Liyan, 2024. "Disclosing and cooling-off: An analysis of insider trading rules," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    6. Contreras, Harold & Marcet, Francisco, 2021. "Sell-side analyst heterogeneity and insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    7. Rahman, Dewan & Malik, Ihtisham & Ali, Searat & Iqbal, Jamshed, 2021. "Do co-opted boards increase insider profitability?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3).
    8. Rahman, Dewan & Kabir, Muhammad & Oliver, Barry, 2021. "Does exposure to product market competition influence insider trading profitability?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    9. Wei Li & Yunyan Zhang, 2022. "Managerial political orientation and insider trading," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(1), pages 513-545, March.
    10. Ma, Rui & Marshall, Ben R. & Nguyen, Hung T. & Nguyen, Nhut H. & Visaltanachoti, Nuttawat, 2024. "Insider trading and climate disasters," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    11. Guanming He & Helen Mengbing Ren & Richard Taffler, 2021. "Do corporate insiders trade on future stock price crash risk?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1561-1591, May.
    12. Cheng, Lin & Jin, Qinglu & Ma, Hui, 2023. "Tone emphasis and insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    13. Millicent Chang & John Gould & Yuyun Huang & Sirimon Treepongkaruna & Joey Wenling Yang, 2022. "Insider trading and the algorithmic trading environment," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 22(4), pages 725-750, December.
    14. Sun, Fangcheng & Dutta, Shantanu & Huang, Hui & Zhu, Pengcheng, 2021. "News media and insider trading profitability: An emerging country perspective," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    15. Akram Khalilov & Beatriz Garcia Osma, 2020. "Accounting conservatism and the profitability of corporate insiders," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3-4), pages 333-364, March.
    16. Pierce, Andrew T., 2024. "Capital-market effects of tipper-tippee insider trading law: Evidence from the Newman ruling," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2).
    17. Li, Yi & Zhang, Wei & Wang, Pengfei & Goodell, John W., 2024. "Social media as an amplifier of insider trading profits," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    18. Lee, Inmoo & Lemmon, Michael & Li, Yan & Sequeira, John M., 2014. "Do voluntary corporate restrictions on insider trading eliminate informed insider trading?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 158-178.
    19. Kyriacou, Kyriacos & Liu, Siming & Mase, Bryan, 2024. "Corruption and insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    20. Hillier, David & Korczak, Adriana & Korczak, Piotr, 2015. "The impact of personal attributes on corporate insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 150-167.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insider trading; Pre-disclosure; Plan-based regulation; Rule 10b5-1; Opportunistic; Planning; Sell-by-plan mandate;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:79:y:2025:i:2:s0165410124000879. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.