The chilling effect of Sarbanes-Oxley: A discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley and corporate risk-taking
Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter [2009. Sarbanes-Oxley and corporate risk-taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] document that as compared with non-US firms, risk-taking by publicly traded companies in the US declined after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (SOX). They conclude that this decline is related to board structure, firm size, and research and development expenditures. In my view, Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter tackle an important question and provide carefully conducted analyses. However, as my discussion highlights, the question is difficult to answer, and as in similar studies on SOX, the evidence needs to be interpreted with caution.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hermalin, Benjamin E & Weisbach, Michael S, 1998.
"Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 96-118, March.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1996. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," Microeconomics 9602001, EconWPA, revised 09 Oct 1996.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1996. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," Working Papers _004, University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business.
- Leuz, Christian & Triantis, Alexander & Yue Wang, Tracy, 2008. "Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 181-208, August.
- S. P. Kothari & Susan Shu & Peter D. Wysocki, 2009. "Do Managers Withhold Bad News?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 241-276, 03.
- Zhang, Ivy Xiying, 2007. "Economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 74-115, September.
- Linck, James S. & Netter, Jeffry M. & Yang, Tina, 2008. "The determinants of board structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 308-328, February.
- Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, 2008. "Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 383-425, 05.
- Guiso, Luigi & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2005.
"Trusting the Stock Market,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5288, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Haidan Li & Morton Pincus & Sonja Olhoft Rego, 2008. "Market Reaction to Events Surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Earnings Management," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 111-134, 02.
- Raheja, Charu G., 2005. "Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(02), pages 283-306, June.
- Christian Leuz & Catherine Schrand, 2009. "Disclosure and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from Firms' Responses to the Enron Shock," NBER Working Papers 14897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 655-69, November.
- Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007. "A Theory of Friendly Boards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 217-250, 02.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:49:y:2010:i:1-2:p:53-57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.