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Of happy and hapless regulators: the asymptotics of ruin

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  • Powers, Michael R.
  • Venezian, Emilio C.
  • Juca, Iana B.

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  • Powers, Michael R. & Venezian, Emilio C. & Juca, Iana B., 2003. "Of happy and hapless regulators: the asymptotics of ruin," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 317-330, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:insuma:v:32:y:2003:i:2:p:317-330
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    2. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Albrecht, Peter & Huggenberger, Markus, 2017. "The fundamental theorem of mutual insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 180-188.
    2. Debora Zaparova & Sandrine Spaeter, 2019. "Risk pooling and ruin probability, or why high risks are not bad risks," Working Papers of BETA 2019-33, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    3. R. Gerrard & A. Tsanakas, 2011. "Failure Probability Under Parameter Uncertainty," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(5), pages 727-744, May.

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