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The role of antitrust policy on the composition of mergers: Further reflections on “stealth consolidation”

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  • Mayo, John W.
  • Press, Robert

Abstract

Did a 2000 legislatively-mandated increase in the reporting thresholds for proposed mergers lead firms to endogenously undertake mergers that now lie below the threshold, with the aim of avoiding regulatory scrutiny? Recent research finds support for this behavior, dubbing this activity “stealth consolidation.” We extend this exploration in new directions logically implied by the theory. Our empirical findings are inconsistent with the theory of stealth consolidations, and suggest that more research is necessary to explain the evolving composition of mergers.

Suggested Citation

  • Mayo, John W. & Press, Robert, 2025. "The role of antitrust policy on the composition of mergers: Further reflections on “stealth consolidation”," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:101:y:2025:i:c:s0167718725000281
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103162
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    References listed on IDEAS

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