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Bayesian games for the cybersecurity of nuclear power plants

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  • Maccarone, Lee T.
  • Cole, Daniel G.

Abstract

Many modern critical infrastructures are cyber–physical systems that rely on the integration of physical processes and computational resources. While this integration enables advanced system diagnostics, monitoring, and control, it also exposes the physical process to cyber-threats. Critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants may be targeted by a variety of threat agents, each with unique motivations, resources, and capabilities. A Bayesian game-theoretic approach is presented to secure critical infrastructure when the adversary’s characteristics are uncertain. In a Bayesian game, some players have incomplete information about the other players. Within the context of critical infrastructure cybersecurity, plant defenders have incomplete information about threat agents, and threat agents have incomplete information about plant defenders. A Bayesian game provides a quantitative method for security teams to identify optimal defense strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Maccarone, Lee T. & Cole, Daniel G., 2022. "Bayesian games for the cybersecurity of nuclear power plants," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 37(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ijocip:v:37:y:2022:i:c:s1874548221000755
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2021.100493
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    References listed on IDEAS

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