IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v325y2025i1p147-166.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Super conflict resolution approach based on minimum loss considering altruistic behavior and fairness concern

Author

Listed:
  • Jiang, Qin
  • Liu, Yong
  • An, Jia-qi

Abstract

Due to difference in strength, power, or status among decision makers (DMs), traditional strategic conflict may be evolved into a super conflict problem where a powerful DM can force others to approach his strategy although other DMs suffer loss. For instance, the government can mobilize relevant enterprises to engage in ecological and environmental governance. Also, DMs may conduct irrational behaviors during negotiations, such as altruistic behavior and fairness concern. To guarantee interests of DMs and sustainable development of decision system, exploring the equilibrium strategy and state that resolves such conflict problem becomes necessary. Therefore, based on theories of conflict analysis, group consensus, Nash bargaining, Berge equilibrium and fairness theory, this paper constructs a super conflict resolution model. Firstly, this paper defines a super conflict information system by introducing the concept of ‘strategy’ and DMs’ information vectors containing DMs’ evaluation values regarding conflict states. Then from the perspective of group negotiation and consensus, we divide the super conflict resolution into three stages and construct a super conflict resolution model based on minimum loss. Considering coalitions’ altruistic behavior and fairness concern, we optimize the model by defining Berge equilibrium and fairness utility function. Finally, a case study of river basin pollution treatment verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiang, Qin & Liu, Yong & An, Jia-qi, 2025. "Super conflict resolution approach based on minimum loss considering altruistic behavior and fairness concern," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 325(1), pages 147-166.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:325:y:2025:i:1:p:147-166
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2025.03.018
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221725002152
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ejor.2025.03.018?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    2. Meng, Fan-Yong & Gong, Zai-Wu & Pedrycz, Witold & Chu, Jun-Fei, 2023. "Selfish-dilemma consensus analysis for group decision making in the perspective of cooperative game theory," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 308(1), pages 290-305.
    3. Du, Junliang & Liu, Sifeng & Liu, Yong, 2022. "A limited cost consensus approach with fairness concern and its application," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 298(1), pages 261-275.
    4. Wu, Nannan & Xu, Yejun & Kilgour, D. Marc & Fang, Liping, 2023. "The graph model for composite decision makers and its application to a water resource conflict," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 306(1), pages 308-321.
    5. Shen, Yufeng & Ma, Xueling & Kou, Gang & Rodríguez, Rosa M. & Zhan, Jianming, 2025. "Consensus methods with Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining game for large-scale group decision-making," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 321(3), pages 865-883.
    6. Cheng, Dong & Zhou, Zhili & Cheng, Faxin & Zhou, Yanfang & Xie, Yujing, 2018. "Modeling the minimum cost consensus problem in an asymmetric costs context," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 270(3), pages 1122-1137.
    7. S. Yu & E. C. Ierland & H.-P. Weikard & X. Zhu, 2017. "Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements under different sets of bargaining weights," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 709-729, October.
    8. D. Marc Kilgour & Keith W. Hipel, 2005. "The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution: Past, Present, and Future," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 14(6), pages 441-460, November.
    9. Meng, Fan-Yong & Zhao, Deng-Yu & Gong, Zai-Wu & Chu, Jun-Fei & Pedrycz, Witold & Yuan, Zhe, 2024. "Consensus adjustment for multi-attribute group decision making based on cross-allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 318(1), pages 200-216.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tang, Jie & Li, Zi-Jun & Meng, Fan-Yong & Gong, Zai-Wu & Pedrycz, Witold, 2025. "Biform game consensus analysis of group decision making with unconnected social network," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 324(1), pages 259-275.
    2. Meng, Fan-Yong & Gong, Zai-Wu & Pedrycz, Witold & Chu, Jun-Fei, 2023. "Selfish-dilemma consensus analysis for group decision making in the perspective of cooperative game theory," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 308(1), pages 290-305.
    3. Chao Fu & Wenjun Chang, 2024. "A Markov Chain-Based Group Consensus Method with Unknown Parameters," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 33(5), pages 1019-1048, October.
    4. Yangjingjing Zhang & Xia Chen & Mengting Gao & Yucheng Dong, 2024. "Maximum Utility Consensus with Inequity Aversion in Social Network Group Decision Making," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 33(5), pages 1115-1142, October.
    5. Tang, Ming & Liao, Huchang, 2024. "Group efficiency and individual fairness tradeoff in making wise decisions," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    6. Meng, Fan-Yong & Zhao, Deng-Yu & Gong, Zai-Wu & Chu, Jun-Fei & Pedrycz, Witold & Yuan, Zhe, 2024. "Consensus adjustment for multi-attribute group decision making based on cross-allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 318(1), pages 200-216.
    7. Xuyuan Zhang & Hailin Liang & Shaojian Qu, 2024. "Robust Consensus Modeling: Concerning Consensus Fairness and Efficiency with Uncertain Costs," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-31, April.
    8. Zhu-Jun Wang & Yangyang Sun & Qin Su & Muhammet Deveci & Kannan Govindan & Mirosław J. Skibniewski & Zhen-Song Chen, 2024. "Smart Contract Application in Resisting Extreme Weather Risks for the Prefabricated Construction Supply Chain: Prototype Exploration and Assessment," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 33(5), pages 1049-1087, October.
    9. Li, Huanhuan & Ji, Ying & Ding, Jieyu & Qu, Shaojian & Zhang, Huijie & Li, Yuanming & Liu, Yubing, 2024. "Robust two-stage optimization consensus models with uncertain costs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 317(3), pages 977-1002.
    10. Yoshio Kamijo, 2024. "A note on the risk dominance of the Nash demand game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(3), pages 1077-1087, September.
    11. Shen, Yufeng & Ma, Xueling & Kou, Gang & Rodríguez, Rosa M. & Zhan, Jianming, 2025. "Consensus methods with Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining game for large-scale group decision-making," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 321(3), pages 865-883.
    12. Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017. "Promises and expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 161-178.
    13. Agnes Bäker & Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler, 2012. "On the Context-Dependency of Inequality Aversion - Experimental Evidence and a Stylized Model -," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-023, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    14. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2016. "Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 235-273, June.
    15. Mengyuan Zhou, 2022. "Does the Source of Inheritance Matter in Bequest Attitudes? Evidence from Japan," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 867-887, December.
    16. Maria Gabriella Graziano & Vincenzo Platino, 2024. "A measure of social loss for production economies with externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(2), pages 443-474, September.
    17. Guang Yang & Mulin Liu & Mei Cai & Qihua Yin, 2024. "An analytical game perspective model for pay-what-you-want pricing schemes considering consumer fairness," Information Technology and Management, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 345-365, December.
    18. Engelhardt, Sebastian v. & Freytag, Andreas, 2013. "Institutions, culture, and open source," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 90-110.
    19. Robert Jiro Netzer & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Intercultural trust. An experiment in Austria and Japan," Working Papers 2009-05, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    20. David J. Cooper & Krista Saral & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Why Join a Team?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(11), pages 6980-6997, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:325:y:2025:i:1:p:147-166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.