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Similarities, differences, and preservation of efficiencies, with application to attitude analysis, within the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

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  • Inohara, Takehiro

Abstract

Precise definitions of four efficiency concepts, one of which is newly defined in this paper, are provided. Similarities and differences among them are confirmed by propositions and examples. By using an analysis method, called attitude analysis, within the framework of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), a proposition on preservation of efficiency with respect to permutation of attitudes is verified. The proposition and some examples give us an insight on roles of self-attitude preserving permutation of attitudes among members in a society for achieving compatibility between individual rationality and social efficiency in social dilemma situations such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Tragedy of the Commons.

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  • Inohara, Takehiro, 2023. "Similarities, differences, and preservation of efficiencies, with application to attitude analysis, within the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 306(3), pages 1330-1348.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:306:y:2023:i:3:p:1330-1348
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.038
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