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An error rate analysis of experimental data testing Nash refinements

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  • Harless, David W.
  • Camerer, Colin F.

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  • Harless, David W. & Camerer, Colin F., 1995. "An error rate analysis of experimental data testing Nash refinements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 649-660, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:3-4:p:649-660
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 803-836.
    2. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    3. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Properties of a measure of predictive success," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 153-167, April.
    4. Banks Jeffrey & Camerer Colin & Porter David, 1994. "An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 1-31.
    5. Harless, David W & Camerer, Colin F, 1994. "The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1251-1289, November.
    6. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1992. "An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1350-1365, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, 2006. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1737-1768, December.
    2. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1193-1235.
    3. Markus Pasche, 1998. "An Approach to Robust Decision Making: The Rationality of Heuristic Behavior," Working Paper Series B 1998-10, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultïät.
    4. Yun-shil Cha & Michelle Choi & Ying Guo & Michel Regenwetter & Chris Zwilling, 2013. "Reply: Birnbaum's (2012) statistical tests of independence have unknown Type-I error rates and do not replicate within participant," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 8(1), pages 55-73, January.
    5. Daniel Carvalho & Luis Santos-Pinto, 2010. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Behavior in Endogenous Timing Games," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
    6. Daniel Carvalho & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2014. "A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 551-577, August.
    7. Vincent Crawford, 2003. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000049, UCLA Department of Economics.

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