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Optimal health insurance contract: Is a deductible useful?

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  • Bardey, David
  • Lesur, Romain

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  • Bardey, David & Lesur, Romain, 2005. "Optimal health insurance contract: Is a deductible useful?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 313-317, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:87:y:2005:i:3:p:313-317
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Karni, Edi, 1983. "Risk Aversion for State-Dependent Utility Functions: Measurement and Applications," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(3), pages 637-647, October.
    2. Béatrice Rey, 2003. "A Note on Optimal Insurance in the presence of a Nonpecuniary Background Risk," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 73-83, February.
    3. Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, 1977. "The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 91(1), pages 143-156.
    4. Béatrice Rey, 2003. "A Note on Optimal Insurance in the presence of a Nonpecuniary Background Risk," Post-Print halshs-03352991, HAL.
    5. Steven Shavell, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 541-562.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe, 2013. "Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 768-779.
    2. Justina Klimaviciute & Pierre Pestieau, 2018. "Long-term care social insurance: How to avoid big losses?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(1), pages 99-139, February.
    3. John E. Murray, 2011. "Asymmetric Information and Countermeasures in Early Twentieth‐Century American Short‐Term Disability Microinsurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 117-138, March.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6467 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00754579 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Jacques Drèze & Erik Schokkaert, 2013. "Arrow’s theorem of the deductible: Moral hazard and stop-loss in health insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 147-163, October.
    7. Plisson, Manuel, 2009. "Assurabilité et développement de l'assurance dépendance," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/5064 edited by Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé.
    8. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6505 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Franck Bien & Arnold Chassagnon & Manuel Plisson, 2011. "Est-il rationnel de ne pas s'assurer contre la dépendance ?," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(4), pages 161-199.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6796 is not listed on IDEAS

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