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Why are extended warranties so expensive?

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  • Chen, Zhiqi
  • Ross, Thomas W.

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  • Chen, Zhiqi & Ross, Thomas W., 1994. "Why are extended warranties so expensive?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 253-257, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:45:y:1994:i:2:p:253-257
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Zhiqi & Ross, Thomas W., 1999. "Refusals to deal and orders to supply in competitive markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 399-417, April.
    2. de Bijl, P.W.J., 1996. "Essays in industrial organization and management strategy," Other publications TiSEM 702f75c5-9ca8-4150-ba8b-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Murthy, D. N. P. & Djamaludin, I., 2002. "New product warranty: A literature review," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 231-260, October.
    4. Mark Pingle, 2010. "Using Gambling to Teach Insurance Principles," Working Papers 10-006, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics;University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics.
    5. Zhiqi Chen & Thomas Ross & W. Stanbury, 1998. "Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(1), pages 131-151, April.
    6. de Bijl, P.W.J., 1995. "Aftermarkets : The monopoly case," Discussion Paper 1995-102, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Aidan Hollis, 1996. "Exclusivity Restrictions in Markets with Adverse Selection: The Case of Extended Warranties," Working Papers ecpap-96-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

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