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Receiver-optimal communication protocols

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  • Smith, Aidan

Abstract

A sender with access to both costly verifiable messages and cheap unverifiable messages provides advice to a receiver. We show that if disclosure costs are small relative to bias and the sender-optimal equilibrium is selected, the receiver benefits ex-ante from restricting the sender’s message space to include only one cheap-talk message.

Suggested Citation

  • Smith, Aidan, 2025. "Receiver-optimal communication protocols," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 257(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:257:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525005464
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112709
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Péter Eső & Ádám Galambos, 2013. "Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 263-282, February.
    2. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1983. "Discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 179-194, April.
    3. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 36-44, Spring.
    4. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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