Multilateral externalities: Contracts with private information either about costs or benefits
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References listed on IDEAS
- Helm, Carsten & Wirl, Franz, 2014.
"The principal–agent model with multilateral externalities: An application to climate agreements,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 141-154.
- Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2014. "The Principal-Agent Model with Multilateral Externalities: An Application to Climate Agreements," ZenTra Working Papers in Transnational Studies 32 / 2014, ZenTra - Center for Transnational Studies, revised Jan 2014.
- David Martimort & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2013.
"Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help!,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(2), pages 361-378, May.
- Martimort, David & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2012. "Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help!," TSE Working Papers 12-340, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- David Martimort & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2013. "Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help!," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00833194, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2012. "Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help!," IDEI Working Papers 746, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- François Castonguay & Pierre Lasserre, 2016. "Resource Agency Relationship with Privately Known Exploration and Extraction Costs," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-56, CIRANO.
More about this item
KeywordsPrincipal–agent; Contracts; Difference due to allocation of private information; Business as usual; Out-of-contract; Permit market;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
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