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Multilateral externalities: Contracts with private information either about costs or benefits

Author

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  • Helm, Carsten
  • Wirl, Franz

Abstract

This note uses the framework of Martimort and Sand-Zantmann (2013, forthcoming) about international environmental agreements. The objective is to demonstrate how a shift of private information from cost to benefit affects contracts and permit market outcomes although this seemingly ad hoc choice has no effect outside contracts and absent market interventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Helm, Carsten & Wirl, Franz, 2016. "Multilateral externalities: Contracts with private information either about costs or benefits," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 27-31.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:141:y:2016:i:c:p:27-31
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Helm, Carsten & Wirl, Franz, 2014. "The principal–agent model with multilateral externalities: An application to climate agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 141-154.
    2. David Martimort & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2013. "Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help!," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(2), pages 361-378, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. François Castonguay & Pierre Lasserre, 2016. "Resource Agency Relationship with Privately Known Exploration and Extraction Costs," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-56, CIRANO.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Principal–agent; Contracts; Difference due to allocation of private information; Business as usual; Out-of-contract; Permit market;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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