Bertrand equilibrium with subadditive costs
We show here, in contrast to recent results, that if firms have different cost functions (that are strictly subadditive), such that the 'monopoly breakeven prices' are different, then in a homogeneous product duopoly there is always a Bertrand equilibrium (either in pure strategies or in mixed strategies).
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- Steffen Hoernig, 2007. "Bertrand Games and Sharing Rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 573-585, June.
- Alejandro Saporiti & German Coloma, 2009.
"Bertrand's price competition in markets with fixed costs,"
RCER Working Papers
549, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Alejandro Saporiti & German Coloma, 2008. "Bertrand's price competition in markets with fixed costs," RCER Working Papers 541, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Saporiti Alejandro & Coloma Germán, 2010. "Bertrand Competition in Markets with Fixed Costs," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-30, June.
- Blume, Andreas, 2003. "Bertrand without fudge," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 167-168, February.
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