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Reputation assimilation mechanism for sustaining cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • He, Siyu
  • Li, Qin
  • Feng, Minyu
  • Szolnoki, Attila

Abstract

Keeping a high reputation, by contributing to common efforts, plays a key role in explaining the evolution of collective cooperation among unrelated agents in a complex society. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily an individual feature, but may also reflect the general state of a local community. Consequently, a person with a high reputation becomes attractive not just because we can expect cooperative acts with higher probability, but also because such a person is involved in a more efficient group venture. These observations highlight the cumulative and socially transmissible nature of reputation. Interestingly, these aspects were completely ignored by previous works. To reveal the possible consequences, we introduce a spatial public goods game in which we use an assimilated reputation simultaneously characterizing the individual and its neighbors’ reputation. Furthermore, a reputation-dependent synergy factor is used to capture the high (or low) quality of a specific group. Through extensive numerical simulations, we investigate how cooperation and extended reputation co-evolve, thereby revealing the dynamic influence of the assimilated reputation mechanism on the emergence and persistence of cooperation. By fostering social learning from high-reputation individuals and granting payoff advantages to high-reputation groups via an adaptive multiplier, the assimilated reputation mechanism promotes cooperation, ultimately to the systemic level.

Suggested Citation

  • He, Siyu & Li, Qin & Feng, Minyu & Szolnoki, Attila, 2026. "Reputation assimilation mechanism for sustaining cooperation," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 202(P2).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:202:y:2026:i:p2:s0960077925015991
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117586
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    References listed on IDEAS

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