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Stability of networked evolutionary games with asynchronous strategy updating rules and different memory lengths

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  • Li, Haonan
  • Yan, Pengfei
  • Liu, Fukun
  • Zhang, Hao

Abstract

This study explores the stability of Networked Evolutionary Games subjected to asynchronous strategy updating rules and different memory lengths. Specifically, in order to incorporate the players’ memory, we develop an augmented logical form of the model employing the semi-tensor product of matrices. Then, the model’s stability is analyzed, yielding two criteria for determining stability under diverse strategy updating schemes. It is found that both the fixed points and the strategy updating schemes are critical to the convergence of the game. Based on that, an algorithm is designed to generate optimal scheme control sequences, ensuring the game’s stability. Under these control sequences, the transient time of the game is significantly reduced. Finally, two examples elucidate the aforementioned theoretical results.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Haonan & Yan, Pengfei & Liu, Fukun & Zhang, Hao, 2025. "Stability of networked evolutionary games with asynchronous strategy updating rules and different memory lengths," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 199(P1).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:199:y:2025:i:p1:s096007792500668x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.116655
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    References listed on IDEAS

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