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How entrepreneurship could be promoted after the collapse of a socialist economic system

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  • Åslund, Anders

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical observations from postcommunist countries to suggest which policy sets applied make most sense for the promotion of micro-enterprises. Three overall conclusions can be drawn. First, an early, comprehensive and radical reform is the superior approach for the promotion of entrepreneurship, because the prevalence of rent seeking interests is so easily established and it is so difficult to break. The second conclusion, however, is that a certain space for small enterprises can be created even in a very corrupt economy dominated by severe rent seeking. A third conclusion is that the Russian deregulation of 2002 represents the worst of all worlds, because all its elements were incremental.

Suggested Citation

  • Åslund, Anders, 2012. "How entrepreneurship could be promoted after the collapse of a socialist economic system," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 157-167.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:asieco:v:23:y:2012:i:2:p:157-167
    DOI: 10.1016/j.asieco.2011.09.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, daniel, 2000. ""Seize the state, seize the day": state capture, corruption, and influence in transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2444, The World Bank.
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    7. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2000. "Entrepreneurs and the Ordering of Institutional Reform: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine Compared," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(1), pages 1-36, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Souksavanh VIXATHEP & Nobuaki MATSUNAGA, 2015. "Entrepreneurial Human and Social Capital in Small Businesses in Vietnam - An Extended Analysis -," GSICS Working Paper Series 29, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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