IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/apmaco/v470y2024ics009630032400050x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

Author

Listed:
  • Hao, Weijuan
  • Hu, Yuhan

Abstract

In contemporary society, cooperation is a crucial element for individuals pursuing shared interests and attaining triumph. However, conventional cooperative evolution approaches frequently disregard the intricacies amongst individuals. In order to gain improved comprehension and refine the cooperative evolution process, we suggest a pioneering deep cooperation strategy. The strategy of deep cooperation is grounded on the conventional Prisoner's dilemma model. It highlights that individuals incur additional costs in the game to attain more benefits while also maximizing mutual social advantages. By doing so, individuals and the collective attain a win-win situation. After research, we find that the system has the following five evolutionary results: only deep cooperation strategy, pure defection strategy, deep cooperation strategy and cooperation strategy coexistence, deep cooperation strategy and defection strategy retained, and three strategies exist simultaneously. The simulation validates that the expensive deep cooperation strategy can enhance the system's resilience to defection, prompt cooperation strategy in the populace to transition their approach to garner a greater payoff, and foster a favorable atmosphere for cooperation strategy. It provides a new perspective for understanding cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hao, Weijuan & Hu, Yuhan, 2024. "The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 470(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:470:y:2024:i:c:s009630032400050x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.128578
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S009630032400050X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.amc.2024.128578?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sekiguchi, Takuya, 2023. "Abundance of strategies for trimatrix games in finite populations," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 448(C).
    2. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    3. Cooper, Russell & DeJong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Ross, Thomas W., 1996. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 187-218, February.
    4. Xie, Kai & Liu, Xingwen & Chen, Hao & Yang, Jun, 2022. "Preferential selection and expected payoff drive cooperation in spatial voluntary public goods game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 605(C).
    5. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2003. "The puzzle of human cooperation," Nature, Nature, vol. 421(6926), pages 912-912, February.
    6. Liu, Siyuan & Zhang, Chunyan & Li, Kun & Zhang, Jianlei, 2022. "Exploring the inducement for social dilemma and cooperation promotion mechanisms in structured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    7. Hisashi Ohtsuki & Christoph Hauert & Erez Lieberman & Martin A. Nowak, 2006. "A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks," Nature, Nature, vol. 441(7092), pages 502-505, May.
    8. Lu, Peng & Wang, Fang, 2015. "Heterogeneity of inferring reputation probability in cooperative behaviors for the spatial prisoners’ dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 433(C), pages 367-378.
    9. Chen, Ya-Shan & Yang, Han-Xin & Guo, Wen-Zhong, 2017. "Aspiration-induced dormancy promotes cooperation in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 469(C), pages 625-630.
    10. Wang, Zi-Ren & Deng, Zheng-Hong & Wang, Huan-Bo & Li, HuXiong & X, Fei-Wang, 2022. "Uneven Resources network promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 413(C).
    11. Chen Shen & Chen Chu & Yini Geng & Jiahua Jin & Fei Chen & Lei Shi, 2018. "Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(2), pages 1-8, February.
    12. Fu, Xiao & Liu, Xuesong & Hu, Yuhan & Huang, Shaoxu, 2023. "Emotion-based renewal strategies to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 455(C).
    13. Yang, Han-Xin & Rong, Zhihai & Lu, Pei-Min & Zeng, Yong-Zhi, 2012. "Effects of aspiration on public cooperation in structured populations," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(15), pages 4043-4049.
    14. He, Zhixue & Geng, Yini & Shen, Chen & Shi, Lei, 2020. "Evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with extortion strategy under win-stay-lose-move rule," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    15. Li, Ya & Chen, Shanxiong & Niu, Ben, 2018. "Reward depending on public funds stimulates cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 38-45.
    16. Lin, Ying-Ting & Yang, Han-Xin & Wu, Zhi-Xi & Wang, Bing-Hong, 2011. "Promotion of cooperation by aspiration-induced migration," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(1), pages 77-82.
    17. You, Tao & Zhang, Hailun & Zhang, Ying & Li, Qing & Zhang, Peng & Yang, Mei, 2022. "The influence of experienced guider on cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 426(C).
    18. Huang, Shaoxu & Liu, Xuesong & Hu, Yuhan & Fu, Xiao, 2023. "The influence of aggressive behavior on cooperation evolution in social dilemma," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 630(C).
    19. Iwamura, Yoshiro & Nagashima, Keisuke & Tanimoto, Jun, 2020. "Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: Cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 370(C).
    20. Gao, Liyan & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2022. "Advanced defensive cooperators promote cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    21. Lu, Shounan & Zhu, Ge & Dai, Jianhua, 2023. "Promoting effect of adaptive interaction based on random neighbors to cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 450(C).
    22. Yang, Han-Xin & Rong, Zhihai, 2015. "Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 230-234.
    23. Xie, Kai & Liu, Xingwen & Wang, Huazhang & Jiang, Yulian, 2023. "Multi-heterogeneity public goods evolutionary game on lattice," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Murnighan, J. Keith & Wang, Long, 2016. "The social world as an experimental game," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 80-94.
    2. Fu, Xiao & Liu, Xuesong & Hu, Yuhan & Huang, Shaoxu, 2023. "Emotion-based renewal strategies to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 455(C).
    3. Markus C. Arnold & Eva Ponick, 2006. "Kommunikation im Groves-Mechanismus — Ergebnisse eines Laborexperiments," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 89-120, February.
    4. Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman, 2018. "Reputation Transmission Without Benefit To The Reporter: A Behavioral Underpinning Of Markets In Experimental Focus," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 158-172, January.
    5. Sun, Peiyuan & Liu, Xuesong & Wang, Enze & He, Mingfeng & Pan, Qiuhui, 2017. "Evolution of cooperation in a spatial structure with compensation mechanisms," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 503-507.
    6. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2014. "Trust, but verify? When trustworthiness is observable only through (costly) monitoring," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 20, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    7. Wu, Steven Y. & Roe, Brian E., 2007. "Discretionary Latitude and Relational Contracting," IZA Discussion Papers 2879, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Quan, Ji & Yang, Xiukang & Wang, Xianjia, 2018. "Spatial public goods game with continuous contributions based on Particle Swarm Optimization learning and the evolution of cooperation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 505(C), pages 973-983.
    9. Vogt, Carsten, 2000. "The evolution of cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma with an endogenous learning mutant," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 347-373, July.
    10. Quan, Ji & Cui, Shihui & Chen, Wenman & Wang, Xianjia, 2023. "Reputation-based probabilistic punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 441(C).
    11. Greiner, Ben & Vittoria Levati, M., 2005. "Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 711-731, October.
    12. Pedro Dal Bó, 2007. "Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 533-540, June.
    13. Huang, Shaoxu & Liu, Xuesong & Hu, Yuhan & Fu, Xiao, 2023. "The influence of aggressive behavior on cooperation evolution in social dilemma," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 630(C).
    14. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2018. "Costly switching from a status quo," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 55-70.
    15. Lin, Jingyan & Huang, Changwei & Dai, Qionglin & Yang, Junzhong, 2020. "Evolutionary game dynamics of combining the payoff-driven and conformity-driven update rules," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    16. Maria Bigoni & Marco Casari & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 587-616, March.
    17. Yoella Bereby-Meyer & Alvin E. Roth, 2006. "The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1029-1042, September.
    18. Claudia Keser & Frans Van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
    19. Quan, Ji & Zhou, Yawen & Wang, Xianjia & Yang, Jian-Bo, 2020. "Information fusion based on reputation and payoff promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 368(C).
    20. Zhang, Lulu & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2022. "The influence of donation behavior on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:470:y:2024:i:c:s009630032400050x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/applied-mathematics-and-computation .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.