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Computational ability in games: Individual difference and dynamics

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  • Liu, Chanjuan
  • Zhu, Enqiang

Abstract

In games especially large scale extensive games, players’ actual views of the game might be different from the real one, because of the limit of their computational power. Moreover, players’ views on the underlying game vary from person to person. Based on some existing work on modelling players’ limited foresight in games, we study several interesting types of players in terms of the characteristics of their actual views. The underlying model is closely connected to the well-known algorithm called α−β pruning, and an algorithmic procedure refining classical backward-induction is designed for strategy choosing in the actual process of playing such games. Further, we study the dynamic evolution of players’ foresight and show the resulting preference change.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Chanjuan & Zhu, Enqiang, 2017. "Computational ability in games: Individual difference and dynamics," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 313(C), pages 313-320.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:313:y:2017:i:c:p:313-320
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2017.05.076
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    References listed on IDEAS

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