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Coarse Matching

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  • R. Preston McAfee

    () (University of Texas)

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  • R. Preston McAfee, 2002. "Coarse Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 2025-2034, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:5:p:2025-2034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Itoh, Hideshi, 1992. "Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 321-345, April.
    2. Martin F. Hellwig & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2002. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2225-2264, November.
    3. J. A. Mirrlees, 1999. "The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 3-21.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    6. Jaeyoung Sung, 1995. "Linearity with Project Selection and Controllable Diffusion Rate in Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 720-743, Winter.
    7. Hellwig, Martin F., 1996. "Sequential decisions under uncertainty and the maximum theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 443-464.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mazali, Rogério & Rodrigues-Neto, José A., 2013. "Dress to impress: Brands as status symbols," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 103-131.
    2. Heidrun Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Emre Ozdenoren, 2011. "Coarse matching with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 75-104, May.
    3. Terence Johnson, 2009. "Matching Through Position Auctions," Working Papers 001, University of Notre Dame, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2011.
    4. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Meyer, Margaret & Strulovici, Bruno, 2012. "Increasing interdependence of multivariate distributions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(4), pages 1460-1489.
    6. Gomes, Renato & Pavan, Alessandro, 2016. "Many-to-many matching and price discrimination," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    7. Gomes, Renato & Sweeney, Kane, 2014. "Bayes–Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 421-437.
    8. Johnson, T.R., 2013. "Matching through position auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1700-1713.
    9. De Fraja, Gianni & Sákovics, József, 2012. "Exclusive nightclubs and lonely hearts columns: Non-monotone participation in optional intermediation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 618-632.
    10. Shao, Ran, 2016. "Generalized coarse matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 142-148.
    11. Condorelli, Daniele, 2012. "What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 613-624.
    12. Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 45-76.
    13. Ron Lavi & Ella Segev, 2014. "Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 791-819, November.
    14. Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 345-348, May.
    15. Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2014. "The choice of the number of varieties: Justifying simple mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 7-21.
    16. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
    17. Kos, Nenad, 2012. "Communication and efficiency in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 233-249.
    18. Blumrosen, Liad & Feldman, Michal, 2013. "Mechanism design with a restricted action space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 424-443.

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