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Majority judgment and majority criterion

Author

Listed:
  • Hiroyuki Komatsu

    (Faculty of Economics, Rissho University)

Abstract

Majority criterion says that an alternative should not be chosen if there is another alternative which majority of voters prefer to it. It is well known that this criterion is too strong: there is no social choice rule that satisfies it when there are at least three alternatives. In this paper, we show that majority judgment, reformulated as a social choice rule, satisfies a weaker variant of majority criterion, referred to as shuffling majority criterion. In addition, we show that if a social choice rule satisfies this axiom and another one concerning non-manipulability, it should pick only those alternatives with the highest "median grade".

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroyuki Komatsu, 2025. "Majority judgment and majority criterion," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 45(2), pages 748-754.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-24-00034
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2025/Volume45/EB-25-V45-I2-P65.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2011. "Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015137, December.
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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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