Patent licensing and research exemption
Within an environment of sequential innovations, real world evidence suggests that the licensing decision of the initial patent can occur either before or after the R&D investment of the follow-on invention. The possibility of licensing after the follow-on invention exists due to the presence of research exemption. This paper examines how the research exemption influences the licensor''s decision to license prior to the discovery of the follow-on invention. Within a three firm setting, the paper reveals that the research exemption does not alter the licensing decision while promoting a stream of future inventions. This provides an argument in support of research exemption as legal scheme.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nagaoka, Sadao & Aoki, Reiko, 2006. "Economics of Research Exemption," IIR Working Paper 06-04, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- James Bessen & Eric Maskin, 2009.
"Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 611-635.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00089. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.