Stock option compensation and equity values
I present a model where increasing employee participation in a stock option scheme leads to higher performance but with a cost to shareholders. I show that firms with higher market values per employee are more likely to have an option scheme and they offer stock options to a broader group of employees. The model yields empirical predictions that are consistent with the stock option boom of the late 1990s and their reduced popularity after the stock market decline.
Volume (Year): 10 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
- Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne R., 2001. "Stock option plans for non-executive employees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 253-287, August.
- Hanlon, Michelle & Rajgopal, Shivaram & Shevlin, Terry, 2003. "Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 3-43, December.
- Ittner, Christopher D. & Lambert, Richard A. & Larcker, David F., 2003. "The structure and performance consequences of equity grants to employees of new economy firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 89-127, January.
- Oyer, Paul, 2001.
"Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?,"
1686, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1619-1650, 08.
- Paul Oyer, 2000. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives that Have No Incentive Effects?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1440, Econometric Society.
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