Strategy-proofness of social choice functions and non-negative association property with continuous preferences
We consider the relation between strategy-proofness of resolute (single-valued) social choice functions and its property which we call Non-negative association property (NNAP) when individual preferences over infinite number of alternatives are continuous, and the set of alternatives is a metric space. NNAP is a weaker version of Strong positive association property (SPAP) of Muller and Satterthwaite(1977). Barbera and Peleg(1990) showed that strategy-proofness of resolute social choice functions implies Modified strong positive association property (MSPAP). But MSPAP is not equivalent to strategy-proofness. We shall show that strategy-proofness and NNAP are equivalent for resolute social choice functions with continuous preferences.
Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
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- Yasuhito Tanaka, 2001. "Generalized monotonicity and strategy-proofness: A note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-6.
- Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.