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The CEO's Representation of Demands and the Corporation's Response to External Pressures: Do Politically Affiliated Firms Donate More?

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  • Jia, Ming
  • Zhang, Zhe

Abstract

This study seeks to explain why firms respond in different ways to similar external administrative pressures, such as government demands for charitable giving, particularly in a transitional economy such as China's. Taking the perspective of the CEO's representation on external demands, the study explores the relationship between political affiliation and corporate giving, stimulated by powerful and politically affiliated CEOs, who are the government's natural constituency and who comply with governmental demands for donation. The study introduces contingent factors that influence the CEO's perception of how to satisfy government demands, and that moderate the relationship between political affiliation and corporate giving. Using firm-level data of corporate contributions following the Sichuan earthquake of May 12, 2008, we find that corporations with CEOs who hold political affiliations have a significantly higher probability of donation and also more cash giving. This relationship is moderated by contingent factors such as government ownership, financial condition, and concentration of voting rights.

Suggested Citation

  • Jia, Ming & Zhang, Zhe, 2013. "The CEO's Representation of Demands and the Corporation's Response to External Pressures: Do Politically Affiliated Firms Donate More?," Management and Organization Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 87-114, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:maorev:v:9:y:2013:i:01:p:87-114_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Jia, Ming & Zhang, Zhe, 2016. "What influences the duration of negative impacts from organizational deviance on other innocent firms?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(7), pages 2517-2530.
    2. Frederik Plewnia & Edeltraud Guenther, 2017. "The benefits of doing good: a meta-analysis of corporate philanthropy business outcomes and its implications for management control," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 347-376, October.
    3. Jia, Ming & Zhang, Zhe, 2016. "How long does the influence of organizational deviance have on innocent firms?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(8), pages 2649-2663.
    4. Zongshi Chen & Douglas B. Fuller & Lu Zheng, 2018. "Institutional isomorphism and Chinese private corporate philanthropy: state coercion, corruption, and other institutional effects," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(2), pages 83-111, April.
    5. McGuinness, Paul B. & Vieito, João Paulo & Wang, Mingzhu, 2017. "The role of board gender and foreign ownership in the CSR performance of Chinese listed firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 75-99.
    6. Yulia Muratova & Jakob Arnoldi & Xin Chen & Joachim Scholderer, 2018. "Political rotations and cross-province firm acquisitions in China," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(1), pages 37-58, February.
    7. Jia, Ming & Ruan, Hongfei & Zhang, Zhe, 2017. "How rumors fly," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 33-45.

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