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Pension fund governance: expertise and organizational form

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  • CLARK, GORDON L.

Abstract

Responsible for the welfare of beneficiaries, pension funds have many tasks and functions. Consequently, their governance and regulation are issues of public concern with direct bearing on the interests of stakeholders and ultimately the performance of Anglo-American financial markets. Subject to common law expectations regarding proper trustee behaviour, also important are statutory requirements regarding the equitable treatment of beneficiaries and the management of assets and liabilities. At one level, discretion is an essential attribute of the trust institution – trustees act on behalf of others not so well placed to manage their own long-term welfare because of lack of knowledge and/or ability. At another level, pension funds are presumably regulated by a well-defined purpose – the welfare of beneficiaries. In this paper, I look at the internal governance of pension funds emphasizing codes of practice, the rules and procedures for decision making, and trustee competence and expertise. While it is important to observe codes of conduct like those advocated by the OECD, there may be significant problems with any system of governance that relies upon rules and procedures. Inertia rather than innovation may be the net result. These issues are developed with reference to defined benefit and defined contribution schemes (and their variants). Ultimately, pension fund governance reflects, more often than not, its nineteenth-century antecedents rather than the financial imperatives of the twenty-first century.

Suggested Citation

  • Clark, Gordon L., 2004. "Pension fund governance: expertise and organizational form," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 233-253, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jpenef:v:3:y:2004:i:02:p:233-253_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Anne Lavigne, 2006. "Gouvernance et investissement des fonds de pension privés aux Etats-Unis," Working Papers halshs-00081401, HAL.
    2. Manuel Ammann & Christian Ehmann, 2017. "Is Governance Related to Investment Performance and Asset Allocation? Empirical Evidence from Swiss Pension Funds," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 153(3), pages 293-339, July.
    3. John A. Dove & Courtney A. Collins & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "The impact of public pension board of trustee composition on state bond ratings," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 51-73, February.
    4. Gordon L Clark & Roger Urwin, 2008. "Best-practice pension fund governance," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(1), pages 2-21, May.
    5. Francesco Macheda, 2018. "The illusion of patient capital: evidence from pension investment policy in the Netherlands," Working Papers 0029, ASTRIL - Associazione Studi e Ricerche Interdisciplinari sul Lavoro.
    6. Barajas, Adolfo & Catalán, Mario, 2015. "Market discipline and conflicts of interest between banks and pension funds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 411-440.
    7. Stefan W. Schmitz, 2007. "Demographic Change, Bank Strategy and Financial Stability," Financial Stability Report, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 13, pages 98-114.
    8. Weiss-Cohen, Leonardo & Ayton, Peter & Clacher, Iain & Thoma, Volker, 2022. "Pension scheme trustees as surrogate decision makers," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    9. Josiah, J. & Gough, O. & Haslam, J. & Shah, N., 2014. "Corporate reporting implication in migrating from defined benefit to defined contribution pension schemes: A focus on the UK," Accounting forum, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 18-37.
    10. Andreas G. F. Hoepner & Lisa Schopohl, 2018. "On the Price of Morals in Markets: An Empirical Study of the Swedish AP-Funds and the Norwegian Government Pension Fund," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 665-692, September.
    11. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar, 2012. "Crisis, internal governance mechanisms and pension fund performance: Evidence from Poland," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 493-515.
    12. Mr. Adolfo Barajas & Mr. Mario Catalan, 2011. "Market Discipline and Conflicts of Interest Between Banks and Pension Funds," IMF Working Papers 2011/282, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Andreas G. F. Hoepner & Lisa Schopohl, 2020. "State Pension Funds and Corporate Social Responsibility: Do Beneficiaries’ Political Values Influence Funds’ Investment Decisions?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 489-516, September.
    14. Gordon L. Clark & Emiko Caerlewy‐Smith & John C. Marshall, 2009. "Solutions to the Asset Allocation Problem by Informed Respondents: The Significance of the Size‐of‐Bet and the 1/N Heuristic," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 12(2), pages 251-271, September.

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