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Oil and Democracy: Endogenous Natural Resources and the Political “Resource Curseâ€

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  • Brooks, Sarah M.
  • Kurtz, Marcus J.

Abstract

By the end of the twentieth century, a scholarly consensus emerged around the idea that oil fuels authoritarianism and slow growth. The natural abundance once thought to be a blessing was unconditionally, and then later only conditionally, a curse for political and economic development. We re-examine the relationship between oil wealth and political regimes, challenging the conventional wisdom that such natural resource rents lead to authoritarian outcomes. We contend that most efforts to examine the causal linkages between natural resource abundance and political regime have been complicated by the likelihood that both democracy and oil revenue are endogenous to the industrialization processes itself, particularly in its developmentalist form. Our quantitative results, based on an analysis of global data from 1970 to 2006, show that both resource endogeneity and several mechanisms of intraregional regime diffusion are powerful determinants of democratic outcomes. Qualitative evidence from the history of industrialization in Latin America yields support for our proposed causal claim. Oil wealth is not necessarily a curse and may even be a blessing with respect to democratic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Brooks, Sarah M. & Kurtz, Marcus J., 2016. "Oil and Democracy: Endogenous Natural Resources and the Political “Resource Curseâ€," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 279-311, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:70:y:2016:i:02:p:279-311_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Basu, Rahul & Pegg, Scott, 2020. "Minerals are a shared inheritance: Accounting for the resource curse," MPRA Paper 102270, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Gochberg, Will & Menaldo, Victor, 2022. "To rent or not to rent? Mechanics, causes and consequences of Ricardian and Quasi-rents in the oil industry," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    3. Lourdes ROJAS RUBIO, 2022. "Inequality, Corruption and Support for Democracy," THEMA Working Papers 2022-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    4. Eslamloueyan, Karim & Jafari, Mahbubeh, 2021. "Do high human capital and strong institutions make oil-rich developing countries immune to the oil curse?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    5. Indra de Soysa & Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2020. "Oil Wealth and Property Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series 8319, CESifo.
    6. Zeynep Clulow & David M. Reiner, 2022. "Democracy, Economic Development and Low-Carbon Energy: When and Why Does Democratization Promote Energy Transition?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-22, October.
    7. Bergougui, Brahim & Murshed, Syed Mansoob, 2020. "New evidence on the oil-democracy nexus utilising the Varieties of Democracy data," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    8. Bybert Moudjare Helgath, "undated". "Oil rent and the quality of institutions in Sub-Saharan African countries: Evidence using the dynamic panel threshold model," Review of Socio - Economic Perspectives 202192, Reviewsep.
    9. Gustafsson, Maria-Therese & Scurrah, Martin, 2019. "Strengthening subnational institutions for sustainable development in resource-rich states: Decentralized land-use planning in Peru," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 133-144.
    10. Christian von Haldenwang & Maksym Ivanyna, 2017. "Does the political resource curse affect public finance? The vulnerability of tax revenue in resource-rich countries," WIDER Working Paper Series 007, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    11. Leiva, Benjamin, 2020. "Natural resource rent allocation, government quality, and concession design: The case of copper in Chile," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    12. Barrak Ghanim Algharabali & Saud Asaad Al-Thaqeb, 2023. "The Natural Resource Curse: Is It Really a Curse?," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 13(4), pages 237-245, July.
    13. de Soysa, Indra & Krieger, Tim & Meierrieks, Daniel, 2022. "Oil and property rights," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    14. Nguyen, Minh-Hoang, 2021. "Resource curse - Wikipedia," OSF Preprints 36uyb, Center for Open Science.
    15. Paul S. Ciccantell, 2020. "Liquefied Natural Gas: Redefining Nature, Restructuring Geopolitics, Returning to the Periphery?," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(1), pages 265-300, January.
    16. Prichard, Wilson & Salardi, Paola & Segal, Paul, 2018. "Taxation, non-tax revenue and democracy: New evidence using new cross-country data," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 295-312.

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