IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/intorg/v68y2014i02p329-359_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation

Author

Listed:
  • Hyde, Susan D.
  • Marinov, Nikolay

Abstract

This article argues that when democracy is not yet institutionalized, leaders have little incentive to push for clean elections, in part because they are likely to face accusations of fraud from domestic opposition groups regardless of their true behavior. Reputable international election observers can facilitate self-enforcing democracy by providing credible information about the quality of elections, thus increasing citizens’ ability to coordinate against the regime when election fraud occurs, and discrediting “sore loser†protests. Patterns of postelection protests are consistent with the argument, including that postelection protests are more likely and last longer following negative reports from international observers. International election observers help promote democracy by making postelection protest more accurate in the short term, thereby increasing incentives for leaders to hold democratic elections in the long term.

Suggested Citation

  • Hyde, Susan D. & Marinov, Nikolay, 2014. "Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 329-359, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:68:y:2014:i:02:p:329-359_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0020818313000465/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. T. Clark Durant & Michael Weintraub, 2014. "How to make democracy self-enforcing after civil war: Enabling credible yet adaptable elite pacts," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(5), pages 521-540, November.
    2. Leandro De Magalhaes & Isabel Spirgel-Sinclair, 2021. "Could Regression Discontinuity estimates of incumbency e ects help monitor parliamentary elections? Evidence from Malawi," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 21/741, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    3. Sarah Birch & Ursula Daxecker & Kristine Höglund, 2020. "Electoral violence: An introduction," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(1), pages 3-14, January.
    4. Fałkowski, Jan & Kurek, Przemysław J., 2021. "The power of social mobilisation: The impact of monitoring the 2015 presidential elections in Poland," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 38-58.
    5. A. V. Egorova, 2019. "Election Observation as Legitimation Factor of Power in Modern Russia," Administrative Consulting, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. North-West Institute of Management., issue 5.
    6. Wagner, Matthew L, 2016. "The civil war puzzle revisited: The use of post-conflict elections as part of peace agreements," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, vol. 6(1), pages 1-24.
    7. Hannah Smidt, 2021. "Keeping electoral peace? Activities of United Nations peacekeeping operations and their effects on election-related violence," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 580-604, September.
    8. Gibson, Clark C. & Hoffman, Barak D. & Jablonski, Ryan S., 2015. "Did Aid Promote Democracy in Africa? The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 323-335.
    9. Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos & Chad Kiewiet de Jonge & Carlos Meléndez & David Nickerson & Javier Osorio, 2020. "Carrots and sticks: Experimental evidence of vote-buying and voter intimidation in Guatemala," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(1), pages 46-61, January.
    10. Ursula Daxecker & Jessica Di Salvatore & Andrea Ruggeri, 2019. "Fraud Is What People Make of It: Election Fraud, Perceived Fraud, and Protesting in Nigeria," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(9), pages 2098-2127, October.
    11. Tobias Heinrich & Matt W. Loftis, 2019. "Democracy Aid and Electoral Accountability," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 139-166, January.
    12. Thomas Apolte, 2022. "A theory of autocratic transition by government leaders: prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 161-189, June.
    13. Dawn Brancati & Adrián Lucardi, 2019. "Why Democracy Protests Do Not Diffuse," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(10), pages 2354-2389, November.
    14. Benjamin Crost & Joseph H Felter & Hani Mansour & Daniel I Rees, 0. "Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 34(3), pages 767-789.
    15. repec:zbw:bofitp:2016_009 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Frye, Timothy & Borisova, Ekaterina, 2016. "Elections, protest and trust in government: A natural experiment from Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2016, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:68:y:2014:i:02:p:329-359_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/ino .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.