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Wealth Transfers in a Rent-Seeking Polity

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  • Richard E. Wagner

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Suggested Citation

  • Richard E. Wagner, 1986. "Wealth Transfers in a Rent-Seeking Polity," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(1), pages 155-171, Spring/Su.
  • Handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:6:y:1986:i:1:p:155-171
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    File URL: http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1986/5/cj6n1-8.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Gwartney & Thomas S. MeCaleb, 1985. "Have Antipoverty Programs Increased Poverty?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(1), pages 1-16, Spring/Su.
    2. Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-557, Part I Se.
    3. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dughera, Stefano & Marciano, Alain, 2022. "Altruism and Strategic Courage. Inside Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 202201, University of Turin.
    2. Alain Marciano, 2014. "Exploitation, Mutual Advantage and The Myth of the Samaritan's Dilemma," ICER Working Papers 10-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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