IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cto/journl/v33y2013i3p347-357.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fed Policy: Good Intentions, Risky Consequences

Author

Listed:
  • Charles I. Plosser

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles I. Plosser, 2013. "Fed Policy: Good Intentions, Risky Consequences," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 33(3), pages 347-357, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:33:y:2013:i:3:p:347-357
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2013/9/cjv33n3-3.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Williams, 2009. "Heeding Daedalus: Optimal Inflation and the Zero Lower Bound," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 40(2 (Fall)), pages 1-49.
    2. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. John B. Taylor, 2013. "Monetary Policy during the Past 30 Years with Lessons for the Next 30 Years," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 33(3), pages 333-345, Fall.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tamim Bayoumi & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Karl F Habermeier & Tommaso Mancini Griffoli & Fabian Valencia, 2014. "Monetary Policy in the New Normal," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 14/3, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Roberto M. Billi, 2011. "Optimal Inflation for the US Economy," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 29-52, July.
    3. Taylor, John B. & Williams, John C., 2010. "Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 15, pages 829-859, Elsevier.
    4. Alan S. Blinder, 2020. "What does Jerome Powell know that William McChesney Martin did not—And what role did academic research play in that?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 88(S1), pages 32-49, September.
    5. Taiji HARASHIMA, 2016. "A Theory Of Deflation: Can Expectations Be Influenced By A Central Bank?," Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, vol. 7(2), pages 98-145.
    6. Michael Kiley & Frederic S. Mishkin, 2024. "Central Banking Post Crises," NBER Working Papers 32237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
    8. Ramon Moreno, 2001. "Pegging and stabilization policy in developing countries," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 17-29.
    9. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2009. "Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 160-170, September.
    10. Willem Thorbecke, 2002. "A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserve: The Pursuit of Price Stability and Full Employment," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 28(2), pages 255-268, Spring.
    11. Bill Dupor, 2005. "Keynesian Conundrum: Multiplicity and Time Consistent Stabilization," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(1), pages 154-177, January.
    12. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.
    13. Roque B. Fernández, 1991. "What Have Populists Learned from Hyperinflation?," NBER Chapters, in: The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, pages 121-149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Alex Cukierman & Anton Muscatelli, 2001. "Do Central Banks have Precautionary Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability?," Working Papers 2002_4, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Mar 2002.
    15. repec:zbw:bofitp:2008_015 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Mellár, Tamás, 2010. "Válaszút előtt a makroökonómia? [Does macroeconomics face a dilemma?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 591-611.
    17. Thomas Sargent & Noah Williams & Tao Zha, 2006. "Shocks and Government Beliefs: The Rise and Fall of American Inflation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1193-1224, September.
    18. Pelin Ilbas, 2006. "Optimal Monetary Policy rules for the Euro area in a DSGE framework," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0613, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    19. Ftiti, Zied & Aguir, Abdelkader & Smida, Mounir, 2017. "Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank independence–inflation relationship?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 215-227.
    20. Staiger, Robert W. & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "Rules and discretion in trade policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1265-1277, July.
    21. Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:33:y:2013:i:3:p:347-357. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Emily Ekins (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/catoous.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.