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Is Free Banking More Prone to Bank Failures Than Regulated Banking?

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  • Kam Hon Chu

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Suggested Citation

  • Kam Hon Chu, 1996. "Is Free Banking More Prone to Bank Failures Than Regulated Banking?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 16(1), pages 47-61, Spring/Su.
    • Handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:16:y:1996:i:1:p:47-61
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    File URL: http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1996/5/cj16n1-3.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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