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Tax administrative costs as a component of tax transaction costs in Poland and other OECD countries

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  • Ryta Dziemianowicz

    (University of Bialystok)

Abstract

Motivation: While implementing a tax policy, attention should be paid not only to the amount of tax revenues but also to the total cost of the fiscal process itself. Only an analysis with consideration of tax collection costs provides the possibility of unequivocal assessment of a tax system’s effectiveness. Aim: The aim of the article is to identify the elements of tax transaction costs and to analyze in detail the tax administrative costs, as well as to assess the effectiveness of the Polish tax system compared to that of other OECD countries. Results: The Polish tax administration is one of the most expensive in the European Union and it requires reforms. According to the OECD, tax collection costs in Poland in 2013 amounted to 1.6% of tax revenues. Among the 56 countries surveyed by the OECD, only Japan (1.74% of revenue) and Saudi Arabia (1.62%) had a higher tax collection costs index.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryta Dziemianowicz, 2017. "Tax administrative costs as a component of tax transaction costs in Poland and other OECD countries," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 16(2), pages 123-140, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:16:y:2017:i:2:p:123-140
    DOI: 10.12775/EiP.2017.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Sebastian Lazăr & Bogdan-Gabriel Zugravu & Adina Dornean, 2020. "Taxes for the People or for the Government? A Global Governance Perspective," Scientific Annals of Economics and Business (continues Analele Stiintifice), Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 67(3), pages 389-407, September.
    3. Siamand Hesami & Hatice Jenkins & Glenn P. Jenkins, 2024. "Digital Transformation of Tax Administration and Compliance: A Systematic Literature Review on E-Invoicing and Prefilled Returns," Development Discussion Papers 2023-14, JDI Executive Programs.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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