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To What Extent Do Latin Americans Trust, Reciprocate, and Cooperate? Evidence from Experiments in Six Latin American Countries

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  • Juan Camilo Cárdenas

    ()

  • Alberto Chong

    ()

  • Hugo Ñopo

    ()

Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which individuals trust, reciprocate, cooperate, and pool risk. We use a battery of field experiments containing the trust game, the voluntary contribution mechanism, and the risk-pooling game, which we apply in six capital cities in Latin America. A salient feature of the paper is that the data is representative of the population from the six cities: Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Montevideo, Lima, and San José. The results support three findings: the propensity to trust and cooperate among Latin Americans is, on average, remarkably similar to that found in other regions of the world; expectations about the behavior of other players are the main driver of trust, reciprocity. and cooperation; and the behaviors associated with socialization, trust, and cooperation are strongly linked among them.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Camilo Cárdenas & Alberto Chong & Hugo Ñopo, 2009. "To What Extent Do Latin Americans Trust, Reciprocate, and Cooperate? Evidence from Experiments in Six Latin American Countries," ECONOMIA JOURNAL, THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 45-94, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000425:008589
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    Cited by:

    1. Lopera Baena, Maria Adelaida, 2016. "Evidence of Conditional and Unconditional Cooperation in a Public Goods Game: Experimental Evidence from Mali," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145797, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Cárdenas, Juan Camilo & Chong, Alberto & Ñopo, Hugo, 2013. "Stated social behavior and revealed actions: Evidence from six Latin American countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 16-33.
    3. Attanasio, Orazio & Polania-Reyes, Sandra & Pellerano, Luca, 2015. "Building social capital: Conditional cash transfers and cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 22-39.
    4. repec:eee:eecrev:v:101:y:2018:i:c:p:35-56 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Binzel, Christine & Fehr, Dietmar, 2013. "Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 99-106.
    6. Barr, Abigail & Packard, Truman & Serra, Danila, 2012. "Participatory accountability and collective action : evidence from field experiments in Albanian schools," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6027, The World Bank.
    7. Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2016. "Disentangling Social Capital: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Coordination, Networks, and Cooperation," Artefactual Field Experiments 00565, The Field Experiments Website.
    8. Alberto E. Chong & David A. Fleming & Hernán D. Bejarano, 2011. "Trust and Trustworthiness in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters: Experimental Evidence from the 2010 Chilean Earthquake," Working Papers 2011-15, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    9. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:1:p:368-382 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    trust; cooperation; Reciprocity; social interaction; Latin America;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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