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Coordination, matching, and wages

Author

Listed:
  • Melanie Cao
  • Shouyong Shi

Abstract

We analyse the coordination problem in the labour market by endogenizing the matching function and the wage share. Each firm posts a wage to maximize the expected profit, anticipating how the wage affects the expected number of applicants. In equilibrium workers apply to firms with mixed strategies, which generate coordination failure and persistent unemployment. We show how the wage share, unemployment, and the welfare loss from the coordination failure depend on the market tightness and the market size. The welfare loss from the coordination failure is as high as 7.5 per cent of potential output.

Suggested Citation

  • Melanie Cao & Shouyong Shi, 2000. "Coordination, matching, and wages," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(4), pages 1009-1033, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:4:p:1009-1033
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. John Kennes, 2004. "Competitive Auctions: Theory and Application," CAM Working Papers 2004-17, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
    2. Neugart, Michael, 2006. "Labor market policy evaluation with an agent-based model," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2006-113, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    3. Neugart, Michael, 2008. "Labor market policy evaluation with ACE," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 418-430, August.
    4. Gabriele R. & Fagiolo G. & Dosi G., 2004. "Towards an Evolutionary Interpretation of Aggregate Labor Market Regularities," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 84, Society for Computational Economics.
    5. Sheng Bi & Yuanyuan Li, 2016. "Holdup and hiring discrimination with search friction," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01277548, HAL.
    6. Sheng Bi & Yuanyuan Li, 2016. "Holdup and hiring discrimination with search friction," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16002, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    7. Marie T. Mora & Alberto Dávila & James Boudreau, 2016. "Social networks and Black–White differentials in public employment agency usage among mature job seekers," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 56(2), pages 433-448, March.
    8. repec:hal:journl:halshs-01277548 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. BI, Sheng & LI, Yuanyuan, 2015. "Holdup and hiring discrimination with search friction," MPRA Paper 65100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Bi, Sheng & Langot, François, 2014. "Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information," IZA Discussion Papers 8288, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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