Strategic Underinvestment in Informative Advertising: The Cases of Substitutes and Complements
The authors analyze the strategic pricing and informative advertising decisions made by firms in duopolistic contexts. They show that, whether the products are substitutes or complements, there exist strategic settings in which firms keep potential consumers uninformed about their products even if the advertising cost is zero.
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Volume (Year): 32 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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