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Ist eine europäische Ratingagentur sinnvoll, und wie sollte sie organisiert sein?

Author

Listed:
  • Erich Harbrecht
  • Martin Wieland
  • Ralf Elsas
  • Ottmar Schneck

Abstract

Die Fehlleistungen der marktbeherrschenden US-amerikanischen Ratingagenturen ließen den Wunsch nach Etablierung einer großen europäischen Ratingagentur laut werden. Erich Harbrecht und Martin Wieland, Deutsche Bundesbank, halten eine Forderung nach einem Gegengewicht zu US-Agenturen nicht für sinnvoll. Die Fehleinschätzungen der Ratingagenturen bei strukturierten Finanzprodukten waren »methoden- und produktspezifisch«, nicht hingegen in einzelnen Regionen besonders ausgeprägt. Wichtig seien international konsistente Rahmenbedingungen, die unabhängig von der nationalen Verankerung der Agenturen Anreize für eine hohe Qualität bei der Erstellung von Ratingurteilen fördern. Auch seien die Nutzer von Ratings – Investoren und Regulierer – in der Pflicht, ihren Umgang mit Ratings zu überdenken. Aus Sicht von Ralf Elsas, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, ist eine Regulierung von Ratingagenturen erforderlich, die Transparenz hinsichtlich der Geschäftsaktivitäten, Vergütungsstrukturen und der Eigenschaften des Produkts Ratings schafft. Für die notwendige Aufsicht über Ratingagenturen seien erweiterte Offenlegungspflichten gegenüber der Öffentlichkeit und Regulatoren unabdingbar. Man sollte eine Art »Rating-TÜV« schaffen. Für Ottmar Schneck, Hochschule Reutlingen, stellen sich keine Fragen zur Organisation von Ratingagenturen, und auch die Größe und Internationalität der Agentur sei nicht entscheidend, wenn der Fokus auf die Qualität des Prozesses gelegt werde. Deshalb sollte auf Validität, Reliabilität, Objektivität der Ratingprozesse geachtet werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Erich Harbrecht & Martin Wieland & Ralf Elsas & Ottmar Schneck, 2010. "Ist eine europäische Ratingagentur sinnvoll, und wie sollte sie organisiert sein?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63(01), pages 03-11, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:63:y:2010:i:01:p:03-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2012. "The Credit Ratings Game," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 85-112, February.
    2. Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, 2010. "The Credit Rating Crisis," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24, pages 161-207, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, 2008. "Reputation and competition: evidence from the credit rating industry," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-051, Harvard Business School, revised Sep 2010.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul J.J Welfens, 2010. "Rating, Kapitalmarktsignale und Risikomanagement: Reformansätze nach der Transatlantischen Bankenkrise," EIIW Discussion paper disbei175, Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Finanzkrise; Bewertung; Wettbewerb; Finanzmarkt; Regulierung; Europa; Vereinigte Staaten; Ratingagentur;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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