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Quelle place pour les incitations dans la gestion du personnel enseignant ?


  • Françoise Larré
  • Jean-Michel Plassard


Abstract In the era of the economy of knowledge and learning, education has become a major issue and teacher has become a very important variable in the process of producing education. Incentives as performance-pay for teachers are frequently suggested as a way of improving teacher performance and educational outcomes in schools, but the empirical evidence to date on its effectiveness is mixed. This paper offers a review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on education experiment and reforms that alter the incentives that teachers face. Arguments for and against teacher incentives are studied. In particular, we examine i) the difficulty in monitoring and evaluation teacher performance, ii) the specific issue of team production in a context of rewarding individual teacher performance and iii) the multi-tasks problem when only some of which are measured and incentivized. JEL Classification: I21, I28, J33, J45, M52.

Suggested Citation

  • Françoise Larré & Jean-Michel Plassard, 2008. "Quelle place pour les incitations dans la gestion du personnel enseignant ?," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 74(3), pages 359-403.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_743_0359

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Janeba, Eckhard, 1998. "Tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 135-153, February.
    2. Benoît Mulkay & Bronwyn H, Hall & Jacques Mairesse, 2000. "Firm Level Investment and R&D in France and the United States : A Comparison," Working Papers 2000-49, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Docquier, Frédéric & Faye, Ousmane & Pestieau, Pierre, 2008. "Is migration a good substitute for education subsidies?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 263-276, June.
    4. Stark, Oded & Wang, Yong, 2002. "Inducing human capital formation: migration as a substitute for subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 29-46, October.
    5. Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
    6. Acemoglu, Daron, 1994. "Search in the Labour Market, Incomplete Contracts and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 1026, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Guido Cozzi, 2003. "The Self-fulfilling International Allocation of Innovation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000189, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Beine, Michel & Docquier, Frederic & Rapoport, Hillel, 2001. "Brain drain and economic growth: theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 275-289, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Michel Plassard & Nhu Tran Thi Thanh, 2009. "Liberté de choix des élèves et concurrence des établissements : un survey de l'analyse du pilotage des systèmes éducatifs par les quasi-marchés," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 99-130.
    2. Erwan Queinnec, 2011. "Do Not-For-Profit Organizations Meet A Demand For Trust Goods ? A Reappraisal Of The Contract Failure Theory
      [Resoudre Un Probleme D’Asymetrie D’Information En S’Abstenant De Faire Du Profit : Les
      ," CEPN Working Papers hal-01367931, HAL.

    More about this item


    performance pay; teacher incentives; evaluation; group and individual incentives; multi-tasks;

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects


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