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La formation continue, un moyen de réduire les inégalités salariales entre hommes et femmes ?


  • Nathalie Havet
  • Guy Lacroix


This paper investigates the returns to formal and informal on-the-job training with an emphasis on gender wage differences. The analysis is based upon the French data set Formation continue 2000. We estimate a system of three simultaneous equations in order to take into account the endogenous selection in each type of training as well as the correlated effects of the unobserved heterogeneity between the training programs and the wages. Our results show that the return to formal training in France is higher for women and that the return to informal training is similar across gender. Classification JEL : J16, J24, J31.

Suggested Citation

  • Nathalie Havet & Guy Lacroix, 2013. "La formation continue, un moyen de réduire les inégalités salariales entre hommes et femmes ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 64(2), pages 279-308.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_642_0004

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 319-329.
    2. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni & Ivana Komunjer, 2012. "Learning from a Piece of Pie," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 162-195.
    3. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
    4. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
    5. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
    6. Michel Breton & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin & Shlomo Weber, 2008. "Gamson’s law and hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(1), pages 57-67, January.
    7. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:03:p:891-906_19 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Hafalir, Isa E., 2007. "Efficiency in coalition games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 242-258, November.
    10. Eraslan, Hulya, 2002. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March.
    11. Serrano, Roberto, 1993. "Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(4), pages 345-357.
    12. Le Breton, Michel & Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio & Weber, Shlomo, 2006. "Gamson's Law and Hedonic Games," IDEI Working Papers 420, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    13. Schofield, Norman, 1982. "Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 9-32, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nathalie Havet, 2015. "Les bénéficiaires de la validation des acquis de l'expérience. L'exemple de la Région Rhône-Alpes," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 66(6), pages 1131-1158.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials


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