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When Ideas Conspire with Circumstances: Introducing Individual Transferable Quotas in Fisheries

Listed author(s):
  • Gissurarson Hannes H.

    (University of Iceland)

Registered author(s):

    Deux ques t ions impor tantes sont rarement posées à propos de lintroduction possible de Quotas Individuels Transférables (QIT) dans les pêcheries : Pourquoi ny a-t-il que deux pays dans le monde, lIslande et la Nouvelle Zélande, qui ont introduit un système compréhensible de QIT dans leurs pêcheries ? et : qui soccupe de la privatisation des biens daccès libre ? Lexpérience de lIslande peut donner quelques réponses. Dans une première partie, lévolution du système de QIT en Islande entre 1975 et 2000 est décrite comme un processus difficile de marchandage. Dune part les coûts de marchandage furent abaissés par la crainte répandue de la disparition des stocks de poisson, et par la relative homogénéité dans les pêcheries pélagiques. Dautre part ces coûts furent augmentés, par lhétérogénéité dans les pêcheries démersales, avec des différences immenses entre les propriétaires de petits bateaux et ceux de grands chalutiers, ainsi que des différences entre les régions. Dans la seconde partie, est décrite la nature du système de QIT: alors que ceux qui détiennent des QIT jouissent de droits dextraction plutôt que de la propriété, lintroduction du système de QIT équivaut à clôturer partiellement les stocks de poisson dans les eaux dIslande, résolvant ainsi la plupart des problèmes associés à la tragédie des communs. Le système a plutôt bien opéré mis à part quelques problèmes subsistants, en particulier le statut légal incertain des QIT et les prises de premier choix. La troisième partie décrit les controverses actuelles au sujet du système des QIT. Nous démontrons que le seul moyen de rendre lintroduction de ce système acceptable pour les propriétaires dun capital de pêche était dallouer des quotas sur la base de lhistoire des prises, et quune taxe spéciale sur la location des ressources serait injuste car elle frapperait ceux qui ont choisi de rester dans les pêcheries et non ceux qui ont été mis à lécart.Two important questions are rarely asked about the possible introduction of ITQs in fisheries: Why are there only two countries in the world, Iceland and New Zealand, which have introduced a comprehensive ITQ system into their fisheries? and: Who cares whether the commons is privatized? The experience in Iceland may provide some answers. In Part 1, the evolution of the ITQ system in Iceland in 1975-2000 is described as a difficult process of bargaining. Costs of bargaining were lowered by the widespread fear of the collapse of the fish stocks, and by the relative homogeneity in the pelagic fisheries. Those costs were increased, on the other hand, by the heterogeneity in the demersal fisheries, with vast differences between owners of small boats and large trawlers, and also between regions. In Part II, the nature of the ITQ system is described: while those who hold ITQs enjoy rights of extraction rather than property, the introduction of the ITQ system amounts to the partial enclosure of the fish stocks in Icelandic waters, solving most of the problems associated with the tragedy of the commons. The system has performed quite well although some problems remain, in particular the uncertain legal status of the ITQs and high-grading. In Part III, current controversies about the ITQ system are described. It is argued that the only way to make the introduction of the system acceptable to owners of fishing capital was to allocate quotas on the basis of catch history, and that a special resource rent tax would be unjust, since it would hit those who chose to remain in the fisheries, not those who were bought out.

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    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines.

    Volume (Year): 10 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 1-33

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    Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:10:y:2000:i:2:n:3
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    1. Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-653, August.
    2. Anthony Scott, 1955. "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 116-116.
    3. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
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