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Collaboration Dynamics in Legislative Co-Sponsorship Networks: Evidence from Korea

Author

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  • Kim Sunjin

    (College of Tropical Agriculture and Human Resilience, University of Hawaii at Mānoa, Honolulu, United States of America)

  • Ryu Doojin

    (Department of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, 03063, Korea)

  • Song Chang Geun

    (Department of Economic and Social Research, Seongnam Research Institute, Seongnam, Korea)

Abstract

We examine the factors shaping the formation of dynamic legislative co-sponsorship networks using unique data from the 20th Korean National Assembly. By employing dynamic probit, Poisson regression, and log-linear models, we explore the drivers of collaboration among lawmakers. Korea’s mandatory co-sponsorship requirements provide extensive data, enabling the analysis of dynamic network formation and path dependencies. Path dependence significantly influences co-sponsorship networks, attenuates partisan effects, and exerts a stronger impact across than within parties. Lawmakers are more likely to co-sponsor bills when they share legislative interests such as representing the same region and serving on the same committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim Sunjin & Ryu Doojin & Song Chang Geun, 2025. "Collaboration Dynamics in Legislative Co-Sponsorship Networks: Evidence from Korea," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:econoa:v:19:y:2025:i:1:p:26:n:1002
    DOI: 10.1515/econ-2025-0142
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    co-sponsorship network; dynamic network formation; legislative process; partisan effect; path dependence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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